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6 April 1976
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR USIB PRINCIPALS

SUBJECT : Discussion of USIB Follow-on
REFERENCE : USIB-A-713, 2 April 1976, Item 2. c.

The attached papers entitled "Comments on USIB Reorganization by USIB Principals" and "Options for USIB Reorganization" are circulated for use in connection with the Board's discussion of this subject at its meeting of 8 April 1976.



Executive Secretary

25X11A

Attachments

4-2.1

S E C R E T

Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
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Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine

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COMMENTS ON USIB REORGANIZATION

BY USIB PRINCIPALS

1. Comments on a USIB follow-on organization were provided to the DCI by nine of the ten USIB principals. The comments varied considerably in terms of where emphasis was placed and the level of detail concerning proposed new organization and functioning.

2. There was unanimous agreement that a USIB-like group of senior intelligence officials should be retained to advise the DCI on substantive matters. For those who commented on the subject, there was likewise agreement that this group should have a role in establishing priorities and requirements.

3. On the matter of the USIB substructure there was similar agreement (among those who commented on it) that committees perform a useful function. Some of the comments included suggestions that the substructure be examined critically with a view to streamlining it, and that some committees should be abolished, redirected, restructured, relocated or created.

4. The major questions raised by comments as to the USIB follow-on can be summarized thus:

a. At what point should USIB get involved in the estimative process - selection of subjects, terms of reference, resolution of basic issues and disputes in drafting stage, advice to DCI on approval of finished product?

b. Should a second USIB-like group be formed to deal with management (vice substantive) issues?

c. What should be the relationship between the NIO structure (or its successor) and the USIB?

d. What role should a USIB-like group have in national-tactical interface matters?

e. How should the objectives, priorities and requirements be structured so that direction is provided to the Community on operations, plans and resource decisions?

f. What should be the role of a USIB-like group in structuring the consumer-producer relationship?

g. What should be the group's role in matters not clearly substantive, e.g., relationships with foreign intelligence services, security, etc.?

5. The major questions raised by the comments on the USIB substructure can be summarized thus:

a. Should the collection committees be restructured (with perhaps more professional staff and fewer sub-committees) to separate the substantive functions from the CFI-related resource and management functions?

b. Is there a need for the CCPC?

c. Is IHC working on the right problems?

d. Do we need a committee to deal with the warning problem?

e. Is the Security Committee performing a Community or a DCI function?

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OPTIONS FOR USIB REORGANIZATIONIntroduction

There is a consensus among USIB members and observers that a USIB-like board is both desirable and necessary. The following options and discussion of more radical approaches to USIB organization, e.g., approaches requiring more basic organizational changes, were prepared after careful review of comments by USIB principals and meetings with the DCI on the subject.

The purpose of this paper is to provide the Director and his Community advisors with further background on this issue. The subject of USIB reorganization has been scheduled for USIB discussion on 8 April 1976.

The two options presented, Option I, "The Modified USIB Option", and Option II, "The Two Board Option", are conservative approaches to USIB reorganization requiring only minor changes in organization and/or the current procedures of USIB.

The discussion of more radical approaches to USIB reorganization is not offered in an optional context. This is not because the organizational ideas possess any less validity than the more conservative options; it is because the more radical approaches will require more detailed organizational development and implementation planning should any of them be chosen for further consideration.

The current status of the organization of CFI procedures, the organization of the national production mechanism, the organization

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of the Office of the DCI and the organization of DOD intelligence, all become mitigating factors which support a view that major actions in reorganization of USIB at the present time are not timely.

In view of these factors and the flexibility of the current USIB structure to review and/or advise on any matter of likely concern to the DCI or of mutual concern to the members, the position recommended in this paper is to implement Option I.

Traditional Approaches to Reorganization

Each of the options presented below is designed to cope with the five primary functions which need to be served by the Board or Boards which replace USIB. These are as follows:

a. Coordination of the National Intelligence

Production Effort

The DCI needs an advisory group of Community members to review and coordinate on major substantive national intelligence products and output activities. This includes national estimates, selected interagency studies, and the information flow and dialogue on the Intelligence Community's warning and crisis network (e.g., alert memorandums).

b. Substantive Requirements and Priorities Generation

The DCI requires a mechanism for the initial statement and prioritization of substantive requirements to serve as guidance to intelligence production and collection operations and planning. At the present time the KIQs, DCI Perspectives, and DCID 1/2 Attachment serve this function. All are currently subject to USIB review.

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c. Collection Systems Requirements Coordination and Operational Guidance

Each collection organization must expand, translate, and reprioritize substantive requirements based upon operational variables to achieve the most effective information return. Under the USIB, the COMIREX, SIGINT Committee, and Human Resources Committee were charged with this function pursuant to USIB guidance and review. Additional functions in this area have to do with arrangements with foreign governments for intelligence purposes, which is a DCI responsibility.

d. Producer/Consumer Relationships and Consumer Research and Assessment

Executive Order 11905 stressed the need for more effective Community action in this area and assigned the DCI the specific responsibility of consulting with the users and producers of intelligence to ensure the timeliness, relevancy, and quality of the intelligence product.

e. Protection of Sources and Methods and Other Support Functions

The DCI requires an advisory group of senior Intelligence Community members to coordinate appropriate programs developed to properly protect intelligence sources, methods, and analytical procedures. With the heavy emphasis to downgrade and declassify intelligence information consistent with Executive Order No. 11652 for wider dissemination, functions and procedures to ensure the protection of sources and methods must be constantly researched to ensure proper implementation of both activities.

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Additional support functions such as take place in the Information Handling Committee and the Committee on Exchanges are also currently reviewed by USIB, and their continued review is envisioned in the options.

Membership

The alternatives for membership in any reorganized USIB structure should be designed to provide the broadest participation by members of the Intelligence Community. Although each of the options provided suggests a specific membership preference which was judged preferable in the case of that option, other membership alternatives can be applied.

For example, the view can be taken that the current membership and participant practices of the USIB be maintained. Another alternative suggests that membership of a single USIB-like committee should consist of all of those organizations designated as being part of the Intelligence Community in Section I of Executive Order 11905. Another alternative would be a select permanent group representing three or four organizations with the other components of the Community having membership on an "on call" basis, participating only when items of direct interest to those organizations are involved.

Committee Reorientation

In the two options presented for USIB reorganization, the present committees would continue to function. They have been renamed DCI Committees in order to emphasize the need for flexibility with respect to their tasking for a wide variety of Community support purposes, including the CFI and the national production mechanism.

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Although such committees as WSSIC, JAEIC, EIC, and STIC are often referred to as "production" committees, their chairmen are quick to point out that their activities cover all five of the functions discussed above. To a lesser degree the same can be said of the "collection" committees, SIGINT, COMIREX, and HRC. The remaining committees, CCPC, IHC, COMEX, and Security, have more specialized support responsibilities. The DCI's memorandum of 28 January 1974 recognized the necessity to coordinate the workload and priorities of these committees and assigned the D/DCI/IC with this responsibility. Such coordination will continue to be a necessity if the flexibility and effectiveness of these committees are to be maintained.

A general reorganization of the committee structure is not considered in this paper. Since 1972, the Security Committee, STIC, WSSIC, SIGINT, COMIREX, and EIC have all undergone reorganization of various sorts. It is expected that the DCI Committees will continue to undergo such changes as the DCI and Community management environment necessitates.

Option I: The Modified USIB Option

Option I creates a National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) chaired by the DCI and recommends that all Community members participate as Board members.

The NFIB will be responsible for:

- a. the review and coordination of national intelligence products;
- b. the maintenance of effective interface between intelligence producers and consumers and development of procedures for continuing identification of consumer needs for intelligence;

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- c. the establishment of appropriate objectives, requirements, and priorities for substantive intelligence;
- d. the review of requirements coordination and operational guidance for intelligence collection systems;
- e. the protection of sensitive intelligence sources and methods and of sensitive intelligence information;
- f. the development, as appropriate, of policies regarding arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters; and
- g. such other matters as the Director of Central Intelligence may refer to the Board for advice.

With the exception of the formal addition of the responsibility in item b. above, the Option I organization would differ from the current USIB only in the change of name and the addition of the D/DCI/IC as a member of the Board.

The pros of Option I are:

- Retains a single board of Community members providing a forum where mutual problems can be discussed.
- Provides continuity in the coordination of national production and the mechanism for working out dissents and disagreements.
- Provides minimum disruption of USIB mechanism and procedures.
- Provides new impetus for consumer research and assessment.

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
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The cons of Option I are:

- Has the appearance of little or no change from the USIB, which the White House announced was abolished at the time Executive Order 11905 was promulgated. The intent was to give the DCI a free hand in organizaing Community assets in support of his responsibilities.

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OPTION I



- Function 1. Coordination of the National Intelligence Production Effort
Function 2. Substantive Requirements Generation and Priorities
Function 3. Collection Systems Requirements Coordination and Operational Guidance
Function 4. Producer/Consumer Relationships and Assessments
Function 5. Protection of Sources and Methods and Other Support Functions

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Option II: The Two Board Option

Option II creates two national intelligence boards under the chairmanship of the DCI.

The National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) would be responsible for:

- a. final coordination and review of the national intelligence product;
- b. review of collection system requirements and operational tasking guidance;
- c. review of Community policies and activities with respect to protection of sources and methods and other Community support functions.

All Community members would participate as members of the NFIB.

The National Intelligence Review Board (NIRB), a second board, would be responsible for:

- a. coordination and review of substantive requirements and priorities, e.g., KIQA, DCI Perspectives, Attachment to DCID 1/2;
- b. review and assessment of producer/consumer relationships.

The NIRB would have three permanent members, the production chiefs of CIA, CIA, and INR, with an on-call participating membership of other members of the Intelligence Community plus additional agencies and departments such as ACDA, whose participation would from time to time be appropriate.

The purposes of the dual board arrangement in Option II are:

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- a. to emphasize the importance of the consumer/producer relationship and the assessment problem;
- b. to tie the above function directly to the generation of national substantive requirements, both current and planned, and their priorities;
- c. to broaden the participation in the NIRB to include other important consumers outside of the Community;
- d. to limit meeting participation of the NIRB to participants who have a direct interest in the subject matter under discussion.

The pros of Option II are:


- Provides a board of all Community members for coordination and review of all primary substantive and support matters of Community interest.
- Provides a more specialized board with broader but selective participation to concentrate on producer/consumer relationships and the coordination and review of national substantive needs.

The cons of Option II are:

- The dual board increases meeting load of DCI.
- The dual board will tend to increase staffing requirements.
- Membership arrangements in the NIRB are likely to be opposed by NFIB members.

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OPTION II



- Function 1. Coordination of the National Intelligence Production Effort
Function 2. Substantive Requirements Generation and Priorities
Function 3. Collection Systems Requirements Coordination and Operational Guidance
Function 4. Producer/Consumer Relationships and Assessments
Function 5. Protection of Sources and Methods and Other Support Functions

SECRETMore Radical Approaches to USIB Reorganization

Most radical approaches to USIB reorganization tend to take on the form of greater functional specialization with respect to the matters being advised upon and/or reviewed. These types of approaches also tend to allow for more specialized membership arrangements related to the form of specialization.

A. One approach suggests the creation of a special board or steering group (associated or non-associated with a USIB-like board) devoted to the concerns of whatever form the national production mechanism takes.

One variation of the above arrangement includes the responsibility for consumer assessment and substantive requirements generation in the same board (e.g., the function of NIRB in Option II above).

Another variation of the production board suggests the division of the substantively oriented board into political, military, and economic panels. This approach tends to be criticized for greater disciplinary division where the demand is for greater interdisciplinary concerns.

A third variation suggests a dedicated committee structure composed of geographically oriented committees headed by the NIO for that area. Such committees would serve to coordinate NIO activities related to production and requirements.

B. Another approach suggests the creation of dual boards; one board devoted to national foreign intelligence operational matters -- production and collection operational requirements, as well as the generation and prioritization of current national substantive requirements. The second board would be devoted to the generation and

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prioritization of national foreign intelligence planning requirements and their translation into a planning base for programming operations and new investment in a budget-year-plus-five fashion. This second board, it is argued, would serve to tie the substantive concerns to the matters of primary CFI concern, and would bring the Community members closer to playing a meaningful cross-program role in the CFI input, thereby compensating for single manager inputs to CFI and potential IC Staff domination of cross-program matters.

C. One radical approach tends toward greater non-specialization of the board. It argues that the board structure should not be confused by sub-boards, committees, and steering groups. It points out that the current committee structure predated current trends in the Intelligence Community Staff, national production mechanism, and the CFI. Thus, it argues for: a single, authoritative and active board with the Director and members more directly in control of agenda and meeting frequency; abolition of the production committees and the incorporation of their activities in the new national production mechanism; greater reliance on the Intelligence Community Staff and "normalization" of day-to-day Community coordination and administration; and recognition that an ax is essential if outdated bureaucracy is not to be prolonged.

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DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN-	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT-	Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN-	Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY-	USIB Departments Only
ORCON-	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
REL . . . -	This Information has been Authorized for Release to . . .